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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mingo timely appeals from the district court's denial of his Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief after an evidentiary hearing. Mingo challenges the district 
court's denial of his motion for substitute counsel and the district court's granting 
of his request to proceed pro se in the absence of a Faretta-type hearing. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The state charged Mingo with possession of a controlled substance with a 
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 98-100.) Mingo pied guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance, pursuant to a written plea agreement. 
(2/14/13 Tr., p.19, Ls. 4-11 1; Ex. 1.) As part of the plea agreement, the state 
dismissed the Persistent Violator enhancement and the parties stipulated to 
recommend a prison sentence of 2 years fixed plus 5 years indeterminate for a 
total of 7 years. (Ex. 1.) Mingo and his counsel Mr. Beus, signed the written 
plea agreement. (Id.) 
Mingo and his counsel also signed the ten page Guilty Plea Advisory 
Form Alford Plea. (Ex. 3.) Mingo's counsel went through the form with Mingo 
and Mingo initialed each page. (2/14/13 Tr., p. 5, L. 22 - p. 6, L. 8.) Mingo's 
counsel told the district court that Mingo understood what he was doing and the 
consequences of an Alford plea. (2/14/13 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 9-17.) Mingo explained 
1 The February 14, 2013 Transcript of Mingo's change of plea hearing was 
introduced as Exhibit 2 at the February 3, 2014 Evidentiary Hearing. 
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that the state had evidence that he "can't beat" and that is why is was pleading 
guilty in the form of an Alford plea. (2/14/13 Tr., p. 7, L. 24 - p. 8, L. 11.) Mingo 
understood that he was giving up his defenses and waiving his right to a jury trial. 
(2/14/13 Tr., p. 8, L. 12 - p. 9, L. 11.) The district court went through the 
advisory form with Mingo and Mingo waived his rights and pied guilty. (2/14/13 
Tr., p. 9, L. 14 - p. 12, L. 9.) The district court also went through the written plea 
agreement in detail with Mingo. (2/14/13 Tr., p. 12, L. 10 - p. 16, L. 8.) Mingo 
said that he had adequate time to go over his case and his options with Mr. 
Beus, his counsel. (2/14/13 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 14-17.) After going through all of the 
forms with the district court and his counsel, Mingo pied guilty, in the form of an 
Alford plea. (2/14/13 Tr., p. 7, L. 24 - p. 8, L. 11, p. 19, L. 4 - p. 20, L. 9.) The 
district court sentenced Mingo to 2 years fixed plus 5 years indeterminate for a 
total of 7 years. (R., p. 11.) 
Mingo filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief and a Motion 
and Affidavit In Support For Appointment of Counsel. (R., pp. 11-21.) The 
district court appointed post-conviction counsel. (R., p. 22.) Despite having 
counsel, Mingo filed a pro se First Amended Post-Conviction Petition and an 
Affidavit of First Amended Post-Conviction Petition. (R., pp. 31-36.) Mingo also 
filed a prose request for all transcripts and court minutes. (R., pp. 37-38.) The 
state answered Mingo's petition. (R., pp. 40-44.) 
Within a week of the Answer, Mingo wrote a letter to the district court 
requesting he be allowed to proceed prose. (R., pp. 45-47.) Mingo wrote "You'r 
[sic] honor at this time, I am requesting that you allow me to proceed pro se, in 
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my petition for post conviction relief." (R., p. 45.) Mingo complained that his 
post-conviction counsel had not been in communication with him. (Id.) 
A few days later Mingo filed a pro se "Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to proceed pro se and withdraw of counsel to preserve first Amendment Rights." 
(R., pp. 48-50.) Mingo requested he be allowed to proceed pro se or be 
appointed a substitute counsel. (Id.) In the memorandum, Mingo listed seven 
attorneys he did not want to be appointed. (R., pp. 49-50.) He also filed an 
affidavit in support of his motion titled "Affidavit of Kevin Mingo in support of a 
Motion for reapointment [sic] of non-conflict counsel outside of public defenders 
office." (R., pp. 51-53.) In his affidavit, Mingo explained that he wanted 
substitute counsel because his appointed counsel was not responding to his 
daily phone calls. (R., p. 52.) 
The district court responded to Mingo's letter: 
Pursuant to your letter received by this Court on September 24, 
2013 you have requested to represent yourself in your pending 
post-conviction case. The Court previously appointed you counsel 
pursuant to your request. The State filed an answer to your petition 
and a copy is enclosed. Transcripts, if they exist, of documents 
you want can be obtained from your counsel in the criminal case. 
Your post-conviction case is set for a pretrial conference on 
December 16 and an evidentiary hearing on January 21, 2014. If 
you truly want to represent yourself in this case that is your right 
and I will relieve the public defender's office of their obligation to 
represent you. If that is the choice you make, the Court will not 
again reappoint counsel for you. I will not appoint you new counsel 
at this time. Please advise the Court in writing within the next two 
weeks of your decision. 
(Letter, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 9/25/14.) 
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After the district court denied his request for substitute counsel, Mingo 
confirmed that he wanted to proceed pro se but also requested the court appoint 
someone to help him with the law. (R., pp. 54-56.) Mingo then filed a series of 
prose requests, pleadings, motions and letters. (R., pp. 58-63, 66-74.) 
The district court held a pretrial conference. Mingo was not present at the 
pretrial conference but his counsel, Mr. Haley, was present. (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 1-9.) 
Mr. Haley represented that he had interviewed Mr. Bues, Mingo's criminal 
counsel, discussed Mingo's claims with an expert witness, listened to the audio 
of Mingo's guilty plea, provided Mingo with copies of transcripts, and was 
working on procuring medical records. (Tr., p. 6, L. 6 - p. 7, L. 2, p. 10, L. 25 -
p. 11, L. 11, p. 12, Ls. 8-18.) Mr. Haley also informed the court that he believed 
he had resolved Mingo's concerns about his representation. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 8-
18.) 
Mr. Haley drafted an amended petition for post-conviction relief that 
clarified Mingo's claims and eliminated one claim that Mr. Haley felt was not 
"justiciable." (Tr., p. 4, Ls. 15-24.) The court stated it would permit Mr. Haley to 
file the Amended Petition, but wanted Mingo to sign the Amended Petition first, 
so "we're not faced with a claim that you withdrew claims that he made without 
authority." (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 3-25.) Mr. Haley explained that he was making 
arrangements to meet Mingo the next day to sign the amended petition. (Tr., p. 
4, L. 25 - p. 5, L. 5.) 
After the pretrial conference Mingo filed a pro se petition for a new pretrial 
conference. (R., pp. 78-79.) Mingo questioned why he was still represented by 
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Mr. Haley, and requested that he be transported for all hearings or conferences. 
(Id.) 
The district court held the evidentiary hearing with Mingo present. (Tr., p. 
14, Ls. 5-14.) Prior to the evidentiary hearing Mr. Haley attempted to visit Mingo 
in the jail but Mingo refused to see him. (Tr., p. 15, L. 21 - p. 16, L. 2.) At the 
outset of the hearing Mingo explained to the district court that he wanted to be 
present at all hearings and he re-iterated his request to proceed pro se. (Tr., p. 
16, L. 6 - p. 18, L. 4.) Mingo referenced his September 22, 2013 letter to the 
district court in which he requested he be allowed to proceed prose. (Tr., p. 16, 
L. 19 - p. 17, L. 7.) Mingo stated that he had asked to be "pro se [in] three 
different motions and eight times in two different letters." (Id.) He explained that 
he disagreed with Mr. Haley regarding the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. 
(Tr., p. 17, L. 8 - p. 18, L. 4.) According to Mingo, Mr. Haley wanted to amend 
Mingo's petition for post-conviction to remove a claim and Mingo did not want 
that claim removed. (Id.) Mingo requested the court appoint someone to help 
him look up the law, but he wanted to take control of his case and he did not 
want anything filed without his "say so." (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 8-24.) 
Now will you please reverse anything that [Mr. Haley] has deleted 
or amended and take him off my case and give me my whole case 
file right here, right now, and anything I have signed be void from 
him being my attorney. 
(Tr., p. 17, L. 25 - p. 18, L. 4.) 
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The district court asked Mingo if he wanted to fire Mr. Haley and represent 
himself. (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 5-9.) Mingo said he wanted to represent himself and 
again made a reference to his September letter. (Id.) 
THE COURT: So you want to fire Mr. Haley? 
MR. MINGO: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: You want to represent yourself today? 
MR. MINGO: Yes, I do. September 22nd. 
(Id.) The district court granted Mingo's request and discharged Mr. Haley. (Tr., 
p. 18, Ls. 10-12.) 
Mingo proceeded at the hearing by arguing that the performance of his 
criminal counsel, Mr. Bues, was deficient because the prosecution was 
"changing evidence on me two weeks before jury trial" and Mr. Bues did not 
object. (Tr., p. 18, L. 13 - p. 21, L. 22.) Mingo also questioned his own mental 
capability to plead guilty and claimed he was threatened into taking the plea. 
(Tr., p. 22, Ls. 1-12.) 
After his opening statement, Mingo testified on his own behalf. (Tr., p. 22, 
L. 16 - p. 35, L. 15.) The state objected to the relevancy of Mingo's testimony, 
but the district court overruled the objection and allowed Mingo to testify. (Tr., p. 
24, L. 13 - p. 25, L. 6.) The district permitted Mingo to "say his piece." (Tr., p. 
2 5, Ls. 1-6.) Mingo testified that the drugs and the scales with 
methamphetamine residue found in the car were not his. (Tr., p. 26, L. 18 - p. 
27, L. 25.) Mingo explained he thought he was being charged with possession of 
a baggy of methamphetamine, but it turned out that he was being charged with 
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possession of the scales with methamphetamine residue. (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 2-18, p. 
31, L. 23- p. 32, L. 9, p. 34, L. 18- p. 35, L. 6.) 
Mingo also called Mr. Beus, his criminal counsel, to testify. (Tr., p. 36, Ls. 
2-10.) Mr. Bues testified that Mingo was charged with possession of both a 
baggy of methamphetamine and the scales and that the state could use either 
one or both to convict him. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 17-24, p. 38, Ls. 17-25.) Mr. Beus 
testified that the evidence showing Mingo was guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance charge was strong. (Tr., p. 43, Ls. 7-23.) Mingo admitted, 
during a recorded jail visit, that he knew about the scales with methamphetamine 
residue and he admitted to trying to clean the methamphetamine off the scales 
before they were found by police. (Id.) Mr. Beus also testified that if Mingo had 
gone to trial and lost, then he could have received up to life in prison due to the 
persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., p. 40, L. 12 - p. 41, L. 18.) After Mr. Beus 
testified, Mingo stated that he did not have any additional evidence to present. 
(Tr., p. 46, Ls. 11-13.) Mingo gave a closing argument and asked to have his 
guilty plea withdrawn. (Tr., p. 46, L. 20 - p. 47, L. 17.) After his closing 
argument, the district court explained that if Mingo was entitled to relief the 
district court would grant him relief. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 6-10.) Mingo responded that 
if he was entitled to relief he would like "an adviser." (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 6-12.) The 
district court denied Mingo's request for an advisor, and Mingo said that was fine. 
(Tr., p. 48, Ls. 11-24.) 
The district court denied Mingo's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 
106-108.) The district court found that Mingo did not prove his allegations that 
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he was coerced into entering his plea and that he was not mentally capable of 
entering his plea. (Id.) 
In his petition Mingo alleged that he was coerced into entering his 
plea and that he was not mentally capable of entering his plea. 
Neither of these allegations were proven at hearing. Indeed, the 
guilty plea advisory form and the plea colloquy between Mingo and 
Judge Bevan absolutely contradict these assertions, neither of 
which were supported by evidence at the evidentiary hearing. 
Mingo has not proven ineffective assistance of counsel, nor any 
prejudice arising therefrom. He has not proven any basis for post-
conviction relief. By definition when a defendant enters an Alford 
plea he or she maintains his or her innocence. That is exactly what 
Mingo did in this case. 
(R., p. 107.) Mingo appealed this decision. (R., pp. 123-129.) 
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ISSUES 
Mingo states the issues on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Mingo's counsel and 
required Mr. Mingo to proceed pro se during his post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing, thus depriving Mr. Mingo of his right to due 
process of law?? [sic] 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Mingo failed to show the district court violated his due process rights 
by denying his request for substitute post-conviction counsel? 
2. Has Mingo failed to show the district court violated his due process rights 





Mingo Failed To Show The District Court Violated His Due Process Rights By 
Denying His Request For Substitute Post-Conviction Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Mingo claims the district court erred by refusing to appoint substitute 
counsel. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Mingo claimed his appointed counsel, Mr. 
Haley, was not communicating with him and requested to represent himself or in 
the alternative be appointed substitute post-conviction counsel. (R., pp. 48-53.) 
The district denied Mingo's request for substitute counsel. (Letter, attached to 
the Motion to Augment filed on 9/25/14.) The Idaho Court of Appeals decision 
rejected a similar argument in Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 343-344, 160 
P.3d 1275, 1278-1279 (Ct. App. 2007). The district court did not err in refusing 
to appoint Mingo substitute post-conviction counsel. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where a defendant claims that his rights to due process were violated, the 
appellate court defers to the trial court's finding of facts, if supported by 
substantial evidence. Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 342, 160 P.3d at 1277 (citing 
State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 715, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001)). The 
appellate court freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the 
trial court's finding of facts. Id. 
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C. The District Court Did Not Violate Mingo's Due Process Rights By 
Refusing To Appoint Substitute Counsel 
Mingo requested, in writing, that he be allowed to prosecute his post-
conviction petition prose or he be appointed substitute counsel. (R., pp. 48-53.) 
The district court denied Mingo's request for substitute counsel and responded to 
Mingo's letter, in part: 
If you truly want to represent yourself in this case that is your right 
and I will relieve the public defender's office of their obligation to 
represent you. If that is the choice you make, the Court will not 
again reappoint counsel for you. I will not appoint you new counsel 
at this time. Please advise the Court in writing within the next two 
weeks of your decision. 
(Letter, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 9/25/14.) Mingo responded 
to the district court's letter and again requested that he be allowed to proceed 
prose with perhaps the assistance of a legal adviser. (R., pp. 54-56.) 
Mingo's request for substitute counsel is similar to the claim in Rios-
Lopez. Rios-Lopez moved for substitute counsel on the basis that his post-
conviction counsel failed to contact him. Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 342-343, 160 
P.3d at 1277-1278. The district court held a status conference where the district 
court ruled on Rios-Lopez's motion. lg_., at 343, 160 P.3d at 1278. Rios-Lopez 
was not present at the status conference and was unable to argue his motion or 
offer evidence to show if good cause existed to replace his counsel. Id. At the 
status hearing, the district court ruled that Rios-Lopez's post-conviction counsel's 
failure to contact him was not grounds for replacement and denied his motion for 
substitution of counsel. lg_. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed and held Rios-
Lopez did not have a statutory right to counsel and held that even if Rios-Lopez's 
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procedural due process rights were implicated, there was no due process 
violation because Rios-Lopez had sufficient opportunity to present his argument 
for substitution of counsel in his written motions. Id. at 343-344, 160 P.3d at 
1278-1279. 
The same analysis applies here. Mingo, like Rios-Lopez, complained to 
the district court that his post-conviction counsel failed to contact him and Mingo, 
like Rios-Lopez, requested substitute post-conviction counsel. Mingo, like Rios-
Lopez, presented his argument for substitution of counsel in his written motions. 
This case is factually similar to Rios-Lopez, and the same result should apply. 
Further Mingo's request for substitute counsel is not supported by any 
evidence that Mr. Haley, his post-conviction counsel, was deficient in his 
performance. Mr. Haley had interviewed Mingo's criminal counsel, discussed 
Mingo's claims with an expert witness, listened to the audio of Mingo's guilty 
plea, provided Mingo with copies of transcripts, and worked on procuring medical 
records. (Tr., p. 6, L. 6- p. 7, L. 2, p. 10, L. 25-p. 11, L. 11, p. 12, Ls. 8-18.) 
Mingo fired Mr. Haley because of a disagreement over a proposed amendment 
to the post-conviction petition. (Tr., p. 17, L. 18 - p. 19, L. 4.) At the pretrial 
conference, Mr. Haley informed the court that he could present two post-
convictions claims, but that he would not proceed on a third claim alleged in 
Mingo's pro se post-conviction petition because it did not make sense legally or 
factually. (R., p. 5, L. 6 - p. 6, L. 5.) Mr. Haley explained: 
But in essence, those are the only two claims that I see that are 
justiciable in any fashion. [Mingo] makes some vague reference in 
his initial petition to the fact that his girlfriend was also charged with 
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the same crime and that somehow that that provides him a 
defense, and it just -- it doesn't make sense either factually or 
legally. 
(Id.) Mr. Haley informed the court that he would attempt to get Mingo's 
permission to amend the initial post-conviction petition. (Tr., p. 7, L. 22 - p. 8, L. 
4.) At the evidentiary hearing, Mingo made it clear that he did not want any 
claims deleted or amended. (Tr., p. 17, L. 18 - p. 19, L. 4.) Mingo explained 
that he wanted to fire Mr. Haley because Mr. Haley wanted to amend the post-
conviction petition. (Tr., p. 17, L. 8 - p. 18, L. 6.) Thus, Mingo's ultimate 
dissatisfaction with his post-conviction counsel did not stem from any deficiency 
of performance but instead stemmed from a tactical disagreement over the 
amendment of claims. The district court did not err in denying Mingo's request 
for substitute counsel. 
11. 
Mingo Failed To Show The District Court Violated His Due Process Rights By 
Granting His Repeated Requests To Proceed Pro Se 
A Introduction 
Mingo repeatedly requested his post-conviction counsel be fired and he 
be allowed to represent himself. (R., pp. 45-53.) The district court gave Mingo 
the opportunity to re-consider. (Letter, attached to the Motion to Augment filed 
on 9/25/14.) Mingo re-affirmed his desire to proceed prose. (R., pp. 54-56.) At 
the evidentiary hearing, Mingo reiterated his desire to proceed pro se at the 
evidentiary hearing. (Tr., p. 16, L. 6 - p. 18, L. 9.) The district court granted 
Mingo's motion to represent himself. (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 5-12.) 
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Mingo now appeals and claims that the district court should have given 
Faretta type warnings before granting his motion to represent himself because 
Mingo had a statutory right to post-conviction counsel. (Appellant's brief, p. 5 
(citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).) Mingo's argument fails 
because he had no right to post-conviction counsel equivalent to that granted by 
the Sixth Amendment. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where a defendant claims that his rights to due process were violated, the 
appellate court defers to the trial court's finding of facts, if supported by 
substantial evidence. Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 342, 160 P.3d at 1277 (citing 
Smith, 135 Idaho at 720, 23 P.3d at 794). The appellate court freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to the trial court's finding of facts. Jg. 
C. Faretta Warnings Only Apply To The Constitutional Right To Counsel And 
Do Not Apply In Post-Conviction 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant's right to 
counsel. State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 633-634, 167 P. 3d 765, 770-771 
(2007). The right to counsel is self-executing. Even if a criminal defendant does 
not request counsel, counsel will be appointed. However, the criminal defendant 
also has the right to waive the constitutional right to counsel. Jg. (citing Faretta, 
422 U.S. at 819; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13.) To validly waive the right to counsel 
the criminal defendant must make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver. 
Jg. (citing State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278, 289 (2003)). The 
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Faretta warnings must be given so the record establishes that the criminal 
defendant knows what he is doing and makes the waiver with "eyes wide open." 
lg. (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Adams v. United States ex. rel. Mccann, 317 
U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). 
However, the Faretta warnings, which ensure a criminal defendant 
properly waives a constitutional right, do not apply in a civil post-conviction 
proceeding. It is well established that there is no constitutional right to an 
attorney in post-conviction proceedings. Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, _, 
327 P.3d 365, 370 (2014) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 
(1991 )). Without a constitutional right to waive there is no need for Faretta 
warnings to ensure that right is properly waived. A post-conviction petitioner has 
no constitutional right to counsel and thus Farreta is inapplicable. 
D. There Is No Statutory Requirement That A Post-Conviction Petitioner 
Must Be Given Faretta-Style Warnings 
The Idaho Code does not require Faretta-style warnings before a post-
conviction petitioner can proceed pro se. Idaho Code § 19-4904 states: 
If the applicant is unable to pay court costs and expenses of 
representation, including stenographic, printing, witness fees and 
expenses, and legal services, these costs and expenses, and a 
court-appointed attorney may be made available to the applicant in 
the preparation of the application, in the trial court, and on appeal, 
and paid, on order of the district court, by the county in which the 
application is filed. 
I.C. § 19-4904. Nothing in the language of Idaho Code § 19-4904 requires the 
district court give Faretta-style warnings when a petitioner elects to proceed pro 
se in post-conviction. 
15 
Instead under Idaho Code § 19-4904 the petitioner may request a post-
conviction attorney and the district court has the discretion to grant or deny the 
request. See Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, _, 329 P.3d 380, 385 (Ct. App. 
2014) (citing Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 
(2004)). As a result, the default position in post-conviction is the petitioner is pro 
se and it is within the discretion of the district court to appoint counsel in the first 
place. There is nothing in the post-conviction statute that requires Faretta 
warnings before a petitioner can represent him or herself. 
E. There Is No Statutory Right to Post-Conviction Counsel Even If Post-
Conviction Counsel Is Appointed 
Mingo's appeal is based upon the incorrect belief that he has a statutory 
right to post-conviction counsel. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Mingo argues on 
appeal that once the district court exercises its discretion to appoint post-
conviction counsel, it has created a statutory right to counsel. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 5-8.) Mingo argues this statutory right to post-conviction cannot then be 
arbitrarily abrogated. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Mingo is incorrect. There is no 
statutory right to post-conviction counsel. Murphy, 156 Idaho at_ 327 P.3d at 
371; Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 291, 17 P.3d 230, 235 (2000). Even if post-
conviction counsel is appointed, there still is no statutory right to post-conviction 
counsel. Rios-Lopez, 144 Idaho at 343, 160 P.3d at 1278 (post-conviction 
counsel was appointed, but Court of Appeals still cited the rule that there is no 
statutory right to post-conviction counsel). Because there is no statutory right to 
counsel there was no due process requirement of Faretta-style warnings. 
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The district court used its discretion to appoint counsel for Mingo upon 
Mingo's motion. (R., p. 22.) Mingo was not satisfied with his appointed counsel 
and repeatedly requested to proceed prose. (R., pp. 42-56; Tr., p. 16, L. 6 - p. 
18, L. 9.) The district court granted Mingo's motion to represent himself. (Tr., p. 
18, Ls. 5-12.) 
If the district court had denied Mingo's request for post-conviction counsel, 
which was within the district court's discretion, then Mingo would have been in 
the exact same position he was in at his evidentiary hearing. Likewise if Mingo 
had never requested counsel. Because Mingo could have represented himself 
without Faretta warnings if had made no motion or if the district court had denied 
his initial request, there is no need for Faretta-style warnings under the 
procedural history of this case. 
Mingo is unable to cite to any controlling case law where the district's 
court's exercise of discretion to appoint a post-conviction counsel creates a 
statutory right which in turn requires constitutional Faretta warnings to ensure 
that right is validly waived. In support of his argument, Mingo cites foreign case 
law where courts have suggested Faretta-type warnings may be appropriate. 
(See Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10) (citing Jones v. State, 69 So.3d 329 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2001 ); People v. Duran, 757 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); 
Owens v. State, 578 N.W.2d 542, 548 (N.D. 1998); McCracken v. State, 518 
P.2d 85, 91-92 (Alaska 1974); Freeman v. State, 65 So.3d 553 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011 )). None of the cases interpreting other states' statutes apply to 
17 
Idaho's post-conviction law. As cited above, Idaho law is clear that a post-
conviction petitioner does not have a statutory right to counsel. 
In addition, all of the foreign cases are distinguishable because they 
recognize, at least in part, some sort of right to counsel in a post-conviction 
proceeding. Jones, a Florida case, states that a Farretta style-inquiry is not 
required in non-capital post-conviction proceedings. Jones, 69 So.3d at 334, n.3 
(emphasis added). According to Jones, the authority to appoint post-conviction 
counsel in Florida stems from "due process concerns." kl_. (citation omitted) This 
is different from Idaho, where there appointment of counsel is governed by 
statute. Jones suggests that some inquiry regarding the movant's decision to 
seek self-representation is "typically appropriate" and a movant should be given 
a sufficient opportunity to make a record. kl,. at 335. Here, the district court 
gave Mingo ample opportunity to make a record and the district court inquired, 
via the October letter, regarding Mingo's decision to proceed pro se. (Letter, 
attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 9/25/14.) Duran, a Colorado case, is 
inapplicable because Colorado, unlike Idaho, recognizes a "limited statutory 
right" to counsel in post-conviction cases. Duran, 757 P.2d at 1097 (citing 
C.R.S. § 21-1-103). The North Dakota case, Owens, is distinguishable because 
the issue was whether Owens had a right to self-representation in the post-
conviction proceedings. Owens, 578 N.W.2d at 548-549. Here, the situation is 
the opposite because the district court did allow Mingo to represent himself. 
McCracken, an Alaska case, is inapplicable because it dealt with appointing 
counsel for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, under the Alaska rules in 
18 
effect at that time, the appointment of counsel was mandatory and not 
discretionary. McCracken, 518 P.2d at 87-88, n.1 and 2. Freeman, a second 
Florida case, is distinguishable because the appellate court held that the trial 
court failed to learn the facts specific to Freeman's request to proceed pro se 
before denying his request. Freeman, 65 So.3d at 557. In dicta, the Freeman 
court said that the district court may be required to conduct a Faretta hearing if 
Freeman continued with his request to proceed pro se. J.g. In contrast, the 
district court here was familiar with the facts specific to Mingo's request to 
proceed pro se because of Mingo's repeated written communications with the 
district court. (R., pp. 42-56.) 
As noted above, this court need not resort to case law from other 
jurisdictions because the issue is answered by the Idaho law that there is no right 
to post-conviction counsel. Without a right to waive, there is no need for a 
Faretta style hearing to determine whether that right has been knowingly, 
voluntarily or intelligently waived. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this court affirm the district court's 
dismissal of Mingo's post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 19th day of November, 2014. 
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